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ABSTRACT: There has been much recent debate over the meaning of the claim that God is good and 
loving. Although the participants in this debate strongly disagree over the correct analysis of the 
claim, there is nonetheless agreement across all parties that there is a single correct analysis. This 
paper aims to overthrow this consensus, by showing that sentences such as ‘There is a good and 
loving God’ are often used to express a variety of beliefs with quite different logico-grammatical 
characteristics. Belief in a good and loving God might range from being an evidentially grounded and 
empirically falsifiable ontological hypothesis, all the way to being a belief which is both ungrounded 
and unfalsifiable, and more akin to an attitude than to an hypothesis. The logical variety exhibited by 
the belief in a good and loving God often gives rise, in turn, to people holding that belief in a way that 
is indeterminate, mixed, or fluid between those different varieties. That is, someone’s belief in a good 
and loving God may hover indeterminately between more than one logical variety of the belief; or it 
may mix together some of the logical characteristics of different varieties of the belief; or it may 
change from having one logical character to another and perhaps back again. These properties are 
often masked by the fact that the belief is always expressed by the same sentence regardless of any 
indeterminacy, mixedness, or fluidity. Though these properties are rarely discussed by analytic 
philosophers of religion, logico-grammatical variety, indeterminacy, mixedness, and fluidity are 
pervasive in religious beliefs and utterances, and account for much of those beliefs and utterances' 
real-life complexity. This paper will make a start at an examination of these important properties by 
using the belief in a good and loving God as a representative case study. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the early 1950s Antony Flew contributed a short but thought-provoking paper to a symposium 
entitled ‘Theology and Falsification’.1 Flew concluded his paper with the following question: 
Just what would have to happen not merely (morally and wrongly) to tempt but also (logically and 
rightly) to entitle us to say ‘God does not love us’ or even ‘God does not exist’? I ... put to the 
succeeding symposiasts the simple central questions, ‘What would have to occur or to have occurred to 
constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?’2 
Flew gives the impression that he takes this question to confront the religious believer with a fatal 
dilemma. For he seems to think that, on the one hand, the believer will not want to say that his 
belief in a good and loving God is falsifiable, because then he would most likely need to admit that it 
had actually already been falsified; and he seems to think that, on the other hand, neither will the 
believer want to say that his belief in a good and loving God is not falsifiable, because this would 
mean that the belief has no informational content, and this would put it beyond the pale of 
orthodoxy. Many philosophers of religion have taken up Flew’s challenge. Most picked one or other 
of the horns of Flew’s dilemma and denied that the chosen horn had the consequences that Flew 
                                                 
1 Antony Flew, ‘Theology and Falsification – A’, in Antony Flew & Alasdair Macintyre (eds.), New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology (London, SCM Press, 1955), pp. 96–9. 
2 Ibid., p. 99. 
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seemed to think it had; and some tried to occupy a position somewhere between the two horns, 
denying that Flew had laid out all the options. 
John Hick, for example, embraced the second horn of the dilemma, insisting that religious 
belief – and specifically belief in ‘the existence of … a loving God’3 – is unfalsifiable: 
Would any conceivable happening compel the faithful to renounce their religious belief? ... [I]s there 
any logical terminus, any definite quantum of unfavourable evidence in face of which it would be 
demonstrably irrational to maintain theistic belief? It does not appear that there is or could be any such 
agreed limit. It seems, on the contrary, that theism is to this extent compatible with whatever may 
occur... It follows from this conclusion that theism is not an experimental issue.4 
Hick denied, however, that the unfalsifiability of religious beliefs means that they lack informational 
content. At the other extreme, Randal Rauser insists that religious beliefs – including the belief that 
God loves us – are falsifiable, in ways similar to scientific beliefs: 
[P]articular Christian beliefs are eminently falsifiable. That is, they could in principle be shown to be 
false ... [O]ne could provide evidence that God does not love anybody. Perhaps, for instance, we could 
argue that there is such a high distribution of evil in the world that it seems likely that God does not 
love any of his creatures ... [T]he belief that ‘God loves me’ is in principle as vulnerable to epistemic 
defeat as beliefs about the natural world.5 
Rauser insists, however, that though belief in a good and loving God is falsifiable, it has not, in fact, 
been falsified. The final example I will note is that of Basil Mitchell, who seems to think that belief in 
a good and loving God somehow straddles both horns of the dilemma:  
The theologian surely would not deny that the fact of pain counts against the assertion that God loves 
men. This very incompatibility generates the most intractable of theological problems – the problem of 
evil. So the theologian does recognize the fact of pain as counting against Christian doctrine. But it is 
true that he will not allow it – or anything – to count decisively against it; for he is committed by his 
faith to trust in God.6 
Mitchell thereby hopes to gain the best of both worlds for the belief that God loves us – for he can 
take it both to attain informational content by being falsifiable to some degree, and to avoid actual 
falsification by his appeal to trust.  
I take these three responses to be broadly representative of the range of positions available 
amongst mainstream analytic philosophers of religion, and I do not intend to discuss them in any 
detail, apart from to draw attention to a quality shared by all three. Namely, that however much 
they may disagree in their respective answers to Flew’s question, they are all, nonetheless, in 
complete agreement about there being only one correct answer. Though each of the philosophers 
quoted disagrees over what the logic of belief in a good and loving God is, they all agree that it has 
only one logic – that the logic of belief in a good and loving God is uniform. Consider how Hick asks 
‘Would any conceivable happening compel the faithful to renounce their religious belief?’, and in 
doing so simply assumes that the same answer will apply to all of ‘the faithful’. Rauser talks of ‘the 
belief that ‘God loves me’ ’ in a way that makes it clear that he thinks that this belief comes in only 
one variety, and that logical properties can be ascribed to ‘the belief’ simpliciter. And Mitchell talks 
of what ‘[t]he theologian surely would not deny’ and what ‘the theologian does recognize’ – 
apparently taking it for granted that all theologians are in agreement over the nature of God’s love 
of humanity and the nature of people’s belief in that love. In their responses to Flew’s challenge 
each of these philosophers is taking it for granted that all instances of belief in a good and loving 
God are of one and the same kind.  
The aim of this paper is to challenge this consensus by showing that belief in a good and 
loving God can come in multiple different logical varieties – ranging from being an evidentially 
grounded and empirically falsifiable ontological hypothesis, all the way to being a belief which is 
                                                 
3 John Hick, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 168. 
4 Ibid., pp. 148 & 158. 
5 Randal Rauser, ‘How to show that ‘God loves me’ is false’, The Tentative Apologist, September 19th 2009. 
6 Basil Mitchell, ‘Theology and Falsification – C’, in Antony Flew & Alasdair Macintyre (eds.), New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology (London, SCM Press, 1955), p. 103.  
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both non-groundable and non-falsifiable, and more akin to an attitude than to an hypothesis. The 
existence of multiple logical varieties of this belief is important to recognise, because failure to do so 
can lead to inadvertent misevaluations and inadvertent distortions. Misevaluation can come about 
because different logical varieties of the belief that there is a good and loving God may deserve 
different evaluations; but if someone is unaware that more than one variety of the belief exits, then 
he is likely to make illegitimately universal judgements – whether positive or negative. He might say, 
for example, that ‘the belief that there is a good and loving God is rational’ or ‘is irrational’ – 
unaware that there are varieties of the belief that he has not examined, but which are nonetheless 
included in his judgement. And distortion can come about because when such a person does come 
across a variety of the belief which is different from the variety that he takes to be the sole one, he is 
likely try to assimilate the new belief – against the grain of its nature – to the only logic of the belief 
that he knows, thereby skewing it. This, in turn, will mean that he is likely to make misevaluations of 
specific instances of the belief as well as on the universal level. Thus if philosophy of religion is to 
engage in understanding and evaluating religious beliefs it is essential that it recognise that those 
beliefs often come in multiple logical varieties. I will show how this variety exists in the case of belief 
in a good and loving God, not only so as to correct generalisations – of the kind we saw just above – 
about this belief, but also with the hope that this will give the reader a feel for how common the 
phenomenon of logical variety may be in the family of religious beliefs more generally. 
I will do this by putting forward a number of simple examples of belief in a good and loving 
God which can act as what Wittgenstein called ‘[c]entres of variation’7 for the broad range of the 
varieties of this belief. Some of the examples will be taken from reports of actual people’s beliefs, 
some will be imaginary, and others will be hybrids of the two. These examples are not intended to 
be premises in, or evidence towards, any sort of argument for the existence of logical variety in the 
belief in question – such as an argument from the authority of the examples, or an argument from 
the number of examples collected. In fact, I am not trying to make an argument at all, in any usual 
sense. Rather, my intention is simply to lay out examples of different possible kinds of belief in a 
good and loving God – and in so doing to implicitly ask the reader: ‘Does this sound natural, or seem 
familiar, to you? Does this example ring true, as a form that this belief does actually take?’. None of 
the examples are intended to force the reader to admit anything – on pain of irrationality – as proofs 
and arguments are usually meant to do. Rather, the examples are intended to bring about a 
recognition in the reader – to provoke or prompt a recollection – that belief in a good and loving 
God really does come in a variety of logical kinds. I take this to be one aspect of the method that 
Wittgenstein is referring to when he says that ‘[l]earning philosophy is really recollecting. We 
remember that we really used words in this way’,8 and therefore that ‘[t]he work of the philosopher 
consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose’.9 
 
 
2. First Centre of Variation: Beliefs in a Good and Loving God which are Empirically Falsifiable both 
with regard to Truth and with regard to Proof 
 
We can begin by considering some simple examples of beliefs in a good and loving God which are 
empirically falsifiable. Consider the following report from a 1983 study of religious parents’ 
responses to the early death of one of their children: 
                                                 
7 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition (Charlottesville, InteLex, 
2003), item 157b, p. 13r; and Ludwig Wittgenstein & Rush Rhees, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Conversations 
with Rush Rhees (1939-50): from the notes of Rush Rhees’, ed. Gabriel Citron, Mind, 124/493 (2015), pp. 8 & 
48.  
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript: TS 213, eds. & trans. C Grant Luckhardt & Maximilian AE Aue 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 2005), §89, p. 309. 
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. GEM Anscombe (Oxford, Blackwell, 1999), part I, 
§127. 
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EXAMPLE 1: [O]ne woman explained: ‘I turned away from (my beliefs) because I kept thinking, “How 
could there be a God?” ...’ ... Often this type of ... [reaction] was described by those who had expected 
divine intervention to heal their children and were bitterly disappointed when the children died instead. 
As one father explained: ‘I used to be a member of the church until after the death ... People had faith 
that Amy would live and it did not happen. So I changed my beliefs. Why believe in something that 
contradicts yourself?’10 
The father in this passage had a belief in a good God which had very clear parameters. According to 
his belief, the existence of a good and loving God was incompatible with the early death of his 
daughter. So, when she did die – contrary to his expectation, and the expectation of some members 
of his church – he found this to ‘contradict’ his belief. In other words, his belief in a good and loving 
God was one which was falsifiable by a certain very specific empirical state of affairs, and indeed it 
was falsified when that state of affairs came about, so he dropped his belief in God. Consider, also, 
the following comments by a Jew who survived the Nazi concentration camps:  
EXAMPLE 2: I lost my faith and stopped believing in God when I saw the Nazis take pious, innocent, 
bearded religious Jews out to the courtyard and butcher and slaughter them for sport, having 
competitions and playing games with these Jews as they murdered them for their amusement – like 
huntsmen sporting with animals – and leaving others, less pious than they, unharmed. How can you 
believe anything after you’ve seen something like that?11  
For this man there was a specific state of affairs which he found to be incompatible with his belief in 
a good and loving God – namely, the injustice of the torture of the pious during the Nazi Holocaust, 
while the impious were left unharmed. This brought him to give up his belief as falsified by what he 
saw happening around him. 
These examples of beliefs in a good and loving God are evidently falsifiable because their 
holders reported them to have been actually falsified by certain occurrences.12 But a belief in a good 
and loving God can be falsifiable even though the believer does not take it to have been falsified. 
Consider, for example (EXAMPLE 3), the case of someone whose young daughter is in critical 
condition in hospital, after being run-over by a drunk driver. The father thinks to himself: ‘If she dies, 
there cannot be a God – for God would never let such a child die so young, so pointlessly’. Or he may 
think to himself something like: ‘If God lets her die, then He couldn’t possible exist’. Or perhaps: ‘If 
she dies here, I couldn’t possibly go on believing in God – but then I’ll be left utterly bereft: without 
my daughter, and without my Father too’ – and at that thought the distraught father may begin to 
pray even more fervently than before. In these cases, the believer envisages – and clearly articulates 
– a concrete state of affairs which he considers to be incompatible with the existence of a good and 
loving God. We may wonder that the death of his daughter should be, for him, a falsifying condition 
for his belief, given that countless men’s daughters have died early and unjustly throughout history, 
and given that he surely knows this fact very well. We may wonder at this fact, but such it is: until 
this kind of tragedy faced him head-on, somehow it did not have the same power for him, and now 
that it is facing him, no other tragedy has any room in his mind. 
It should be noted that a person may hold a falsifiable but unfalsified belief in a good and 
loving God – as in Example 3 – but without articulating, or even thinking of, the conditions that they 
would count as being falsifying. Perhaps they could be prompted to articulate those conditions by 
means of probing questions. Or perhaps they could be provoked to make conscious those conditions 
                                                 
10 Judith Cook & Dale W Wimberley, ‘If I Should Die before I Wake: Religious Commitment and Adjustment to 
the Death of a Child’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 22/3 (1983), p. 227. 
11 Reeve Robert Brenner, The Faith and Doubt of Holocaust Survivors (New York, The Free Press, 1980), p. 114. 
12 It is important to note that the mere fact that someone ceases to believe in a good and loving God as a 
result of the obtaining of a certain empirical state of affairs does not by itself show that the belief in question 
must have been an empirically falsifiable one – for the empirical state of affairs may have been merely the 
cause of the person’s ceasing to hold the belief. Rather, a belief will count as an empirically falsifiable one if 
the obtaining of an empirical state of affairs is the reason why the person gave up their belief, or the reason 
why they ought to. Thus it is significant that the father in Example 1 explicitly identified the unexpected death 
of his daughter as the reason why he stopped believing. 
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when confronted with the immanent possibility of one of the conditions’ instantiation – such as with 
the father in Example 3. But it is possible that they never bring these conditions to consciousness at 
all, let alone articulate them. One’s belief being falsifiable is a dispositional matter, and someone can 
have a disposition despite its never being manifested.13 
The examples of beliefs presented in this section can be described as empirically falsifiable 
both with regard to truth and also with regard to proof. They are empirically falsifiable with regard 
to truth, in that for each of them there are describable empirical states of affairs the obtaining of 
which are taken to be incompatible with the truth of the beliefs in question; and they are empirically 
falsifiable with regard to proof, in that if those describable empirical states of affairs were to obtain, 
they would be easily identifiable and observable, and therefore able to be submitted as proof 
against the truth of the beliefs in question. 
I take Examples 1, 2, and 3, to mark out one centre of logical variation for beliefs in a good 
and loving God. As with all the examples that I will present in the course of this paper, the question 
that readers must ask themselves is whether these examples ring true as ways that religious 
believers sometimes actually talk about and treat their beliefs in a good and loving God. If some of 
them do ring true then this should already make it clear that there is something seriously deficient in 
the descriptions of the logic of belief in a good and loving God given by both Hick and Mitchell in 
Section 1 – that ‘theism is … compatible with whatever may occur’14 and that ‘the theologian ... will 
not allow ... anything ... to count decisively against’ the ‘assertion that God loves men’.15 These 
universal statements have completely ignored the kinds of belief in a good and loving God which we 
have seen exemplified in this section. 
Let us now turn to some further examples of belief in a good and loving God – but examples 
whose logics seems slightly different to those of the beliefs just presented.  
 
 
3. Second Centre of Variation: Beliefs in a Good and Loving God which are Empirically Falsifiable 
with regard to Truth, but not with regard to Proof 
 
Consider the following remarks from a sermon given – in 1912 – by the then popular American 
preacher, James Russell Miller (1840–1912): 
EXAMPLE 4: Sometimes there is inscrutable mystery in the difficult experiences through which godly 
people are led. A few years ago a happy young couple came from the marriage altar, full of hope and 
joy ... A year later a baby came and was welcomed with great gladness. From the beginning, however, 
the little one was a sufferer. She was taken to one of the best physicians in the land. After careful 
examination, his decision was that her condition is absolutely hopeless ... What comfort can we give to 
such mothers as this? Yes, it is hard to look upon the child's condition, so pathetic, so pitiful, and to 
remember the doctor's words: ‘Absolutely hopeless!’ Is there any comfort for this condition? Can this 
mother say that God is leading her in the path of life? Is this experience of suffering, part of that path? 
Does God know about the long struggle of this mother? Does he know what the doctor said? Yes – he 
knows all. Has he then no power to do anything? Yes – he has all power. Why, then, does he not cure 
this child? We may not try to answer. We do not know God's reasons. Yet we know it is all right. What 
good can possibly come from this child's condition, and from the continuation of this painful condition 
year after year? We do not know. Perhaps it is for the sake of the mother and father, who are being led 
through these years of anguish, disappointment and sorrow. Many people suffer for the sake of others, 
and we know at least that these parents are receiving a training in unselfishness, in gentleness, in 
patience, in trust. ... Let us never be afraid, however great our sufferings, however dark life is. Let us go 
on in faith and love, never doubting, not even asking why, bearing our pain and learning to sing while 
we suffer. God is watching, and he will bring good and beauty out of all our suffering.16 
                                                 
13 This also applies to the other varieties of the belief that we will see in the succeeding sections. 
14 Hick, Faith and Knowledge, pp. 148 & 158. 
15 Mitchell, ‘Theology and Falsification’, p. 103. 
16 JR Miller, ‘You Will Not Mind the Roughness’, Grace Gems. 
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Miller’s sermon deals with what is almost the paradigmatic prima facie falsifier of belief in a good 
and loving God – the suffering of an innocent child. Miller ‘defuses’ this prima facie falsifier, 
however, by insisting that God will ‘bring good and beauty out of all our suffering’. In other words, 
God is morally justified in allowing or causing the suffering in question because He is only doing so in 
order to bring about from it an outweighing good. Miller even suggests one possibility of a good that 
God may have intended by the child’s suffering: ‘Perhaps it is for the sake of the mother and father, 
who ... are receiving a training in unselfishness, in gentleness, in patience, in trust.’ However, Miller 
is very clear that this is just one possibility, and that in fact, we are in no position to know what good 
God intends to bring from any given suffering. If the parents buckle under the stress of caring for 
their sick child, and their marriage falls apart with recriminations and bitterness, Miller would simply 
insist that we are not in a position to know what goods will sprout, perhaps in some distant way, at 
some distant time, from the tragedy of the child and that of his parents’ marriage – but we should 
have faith that some worthwhile good certainly will result. The kind of goods that Miller believes 
God will bring to flourish from sufferings are all perfectly intelligible and describable causal 
consequences of the evils in question – it is just that, given the complexity of the goods that God can 
bring from given evils, and given our limited capacities, we will never be in a position to be able to 
identify whether or not they have come about. Thus Miller has put forward a defuser of the prima 
facie falsifier of the child’s suffering – but his defuser is such that it is not itself easily falsified.  
 The defuser appealed to in this kind of belief need not only be that the prima facie falsifier 
will allow for an outweighing good of some sort, but could equally well be that it might allow for the 
avoidance of a significantly greater evil. Consider the following summary of the responses of some 
religious parents who had been bereaved of children: 
EXAMPLE 5: Parents who spoke of religion and their beliefs ... also spoke of God having some reason for 
their child's death ... A few parents suggested their child may have had some sort of abnormality and 
they had to trust that God knew best: ‘I accepted that God knew there was something wrong and that's 
why she had died. And He knew that, whatever was wrong, we couldn't handle it, between ourselves, 
that it was His will.’17 
The kinds of evil that the parent may think their child’s death avoided could all have been easily 
imaginable and describable. However, we would never be in a position to confirm whether or not 
one or other of these maladies really lay in the child’s future – for the wrong could have been some 
subtle physical disease, and it could equally have been an undetectable latent moral disorder, or 
spiritual sickness.  
 The kind of defusers that we have seen used in the above two examples can be applied very 
broadly to all evils – taking evils universally to happen either so as to causally bring about 
outweighing goods or to effect the avoidance of greater evils. If we asked a believer (EXAMPLE 6) 
who appeals to such defusers whether or not there is a state of affairs which he would take to falsify 
– to be inconsistent with – the existence of a good and loving God, he might reply: ‘Of course there 
is! – Namely, a state of affairs in which there was suffering which did not allow for any outweighing 
good or for the avoidance of any greater evil. That is, if there were suffering which was pointless. 
And it is not hard to imagine a case of such suffering – such as a person dying young, when, on the 
one hand, he would actually have gone on to have had a wonderful life, bringing joy to all around 
him, and where his death, on the other hand, does not lead to any material, moral, or spiritual 
growth by any others. Such random and meaningless suffering would be completely incompatible 
with the existence of a good and loving God – but we humans can never be in a position to identify 
any suffering as being meaningless in that way, because we can never see the whole picture. And 
this is precisely what it means to have faith in God: to trust in Him, that He is there, guiding 
everything around us for the best, even when that cannot be seen.’  
How, then, do the logics of the beliefs exemplified in this section compare with those of the 
beliefs exemplified in the previous section? The beliefs in the previous section were empirically 
                                                 
17 Kathleen Gilbert, ‘Religion as a Resource for Bereaved Parents’, Journal of Religion and Health, 31/1 (1992), 
pp. 22–3. 
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falsifiable both with regard to truth and proof, whereas the beliefs of this section are empirically 
falsifiable with regard to truth but not with regard to proof. For though there are describable 
empirical states of affairs the obtaining of which are taken to be incompatible with the truth of this 
section’s beliefs, those states of affairs could never be shown to obtain. There are therefore some 
similarities between the beliefs of this section and previous one, but also so significant differences. 
 
 
4. Third Centre of Variation: Beliefs in a Good and Loving God which are not Empirically Falsifiable, 
but which are Philosophically Falsifiable 
 
There is yet another form that belief in a good and loving God can take – but which is not empirically 
falsifiable at all. Believers whose beliefs are of this third variety acknowledge that there are many 
prima facie falsifiers of their belief in a good and loving God, but they defuse these falsifiers by 
claiming that all evils bear a necessary relation to certain goods which outweigh them, which provide 
an explanation (or a possible explanation) for why a good and loving God would allow the evils to 
happen. Richard Swinburne’s belief in a good and loving God seems to be of this kind: 
EXAMPLE 7: [T]he good of individual humans (and in so far as they are capable thereof, the good of 
animals) consists (as well as in their having thrills of pleasure) in their having free will to choose 
between good and evil, the ability to develop their own characters and those of their fellows, to show 
courage and loyalty, to love, to be of use, to contemplate beauty and discover truth – and if there is a 
God it consists above all in voluntary service and adoration of him in the company of one’s fellows, for 
ever and ever. All that ... cannot be achieved without quite a bit of suffering on the way ... [O]f each ... 
[moral and natural evil] it is the case that by allowing it to occur God makes possible a good which he 
could not otherwise make possible without allowing it (or an equally bad state) to occur. Every moral 
evil in the world is such that God allowing it to occur makes possible (given the assumption that humans 
have free will) the great good of a particular choice between good and bad. Every bad desire facilitates 
such a choice. Every false belief makes possible the great good of investigation, especially cooperative 
investigation, and the great good of some of us helping others towards the truth. Every pain makes 
possible a courageous response (in all except animals caused to respond badly, and humans who do not 
yet realize what is the good response), and normally the goods of compassion and sympathetic action. 
And those animal pains to which animals are caused to respond badly, and those human pains to which 
humans respond with self-pity in ignorance of what a good thing a courageous response would be, still 
provide many opportunities and much knowledge for others. We can respond to the self-pitying 
humans by helping them to do better; their failure is our opportunity. And all animal pain gives 
knowledge and opportunity for compassion to animals and humans if they know of it ... Each bad state 
or possible bad state removed takes away one actual good. Each small addition to the number of actual 
or possible bad states makes a small addition to the number of actual or possible good states.18   
According to Swinburne the evils in the world are the necessarily possible side-effects of the 
existence of free will, and the value of the existence of free will outweighs the evil which stems from 
it; and furthermore, sometimes evils are themselves necessary conditions for the opportunity for 
moral and spiritual character development, and the value of this opportunity outweighs the evils 
which are necessary for it. We must note that Swinburne’s defuser is not the fact that people 
actually do a certain minimal amount of good as a result of their free will, or that they actually 
develop their moral and spiritual characters to a certain minimal degree as a result of the evils that 
challenge them. If this was his defuser then it would itself be open to empirical falsification – 
namely, by a preponderance of immoral uses of our freedom, and a preponderance of selfish and 
cowardly responses to our own and others’ suffering. But Swinburne’s defuser does not commit him 
to any empirical states at all, for his defuser relies on the value of the mere existence of free will and 
of the mere existence of the opportunity for moral and spiritual character development – and not on 
whether that freedom or opportunity are used well or badly. Thus, whatever happens in the world, 
Swinburne will not take his belief in a good and loving God to have been falsified – for he thinks that 
                                                 
18 Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. xii & 217–18. 
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all evils can be accounted for by their necessary relation to the values of free will and opportunity 
for moral and spiritual growth.  
 However, the fact that Swinburne’s belief is not empirically falsifiable, does not mean that it 
is utterly unfalsifiable – for it relies on the truth of all manner of contested philosophical positions, 
and these positions could perhaps be shown to be false by philosophical proof and argument. One of 
philosophical premises on which Swinburne’s defusers depend is his set of axiological judgements 
regarding various relative value-weightings; another is his moral judgement regarding whether it is 
permissible for an agent to inflict suffering on one being for the benefit of another. Swinburne, in 
fact, explicitly acknowledges that his defusers ‘will only convince fully those readers who come to 
accept many of the moral views [which I have] advocated ... about which actions and states of affairs 
are good’.19 Swinburne can hold that his philosophical judgements are not false, but are nonetheless 
philosophically falsifiable. Holding a philosophical position in a falsifiable manner may involve being 
able to state clearly which other philosophical positions would be incompatible with one’s own; and 
perhaps even more than that, being able to explain what kind of arguments could be made in order 
to convince one of one of those incompatible philosophical truths. Thus, Swinburne could 
acknowledge that a strong deontological ethics – which held that killing others was always 
forbidden, no matter what good end one hopes to achieve thereby – would be incompatible with his 
defuser. He may even be able to point to precisely how a Kantian argument would need to be 
bolstered in order to convince him of the truth of that deontological principle. He believes that the 
argument cannot be bolstered in the necessary ways, but he is open to being shown otherwise. 
Thus, though his belief in a good and loving God is not open to empirical falsification of any sort – 
either with regard to truth or with regard to proof – it is nonetheless open to falsification of some 
sort, namely, philosophical falsification. 
 
 
5. Fourth Centre of Variation: Beliefs in a Good and Loving God which are Non-Falsifiable 
 
The final cluster of examples that I will bring, is of beliefs in a good and loving God which seem to be 
of a radically different kind to any of the preceding. Consider the following passage from a sermon 
given by Rabbi Shimon Schwab (1908–1995) who managed to escape Nazi Germany for America in 
the 1930s: 
EXAMPLE 8: There are so many who ask the question ‘Why?’ There’s no doubt that all the troubles 
which befall the Jewish people, are by no means accidental. They are punishments for our historic sins, 
such as assimilation, beginning in ancient times and continuing through our most recent past. However, 
this does not explain the massive holocaust which was allowed by the Holy One (blessed be He) to take 
place. We do not dare give any explanations, nor do we even search for answers. We do not ask the 
questions that so many ask: How come so many righteous ones, holy ones, and pure ones were choked 
to death in gas chambers? What was the sin of one million Jewish children who were murdered in cold 
blood? Why were all those millions of innocent Jews by virtue of their ignorance – slaughtered like 
sheep? As to the masses of Torah Jews, they all did repentance, and they all were already purified by 
their sufferings. How come the prayers of those righteous ones and holy ones and all those thousands 
of penitents were not answered? And on the other hand, many non-believers – violators of the Torah – 
were saved. The answer is: silence! We do not dare ask.20 
It is clear that Rabbi Schwab is deeply troubled by the suffering, destruction, and injustice of the 
Holocaust. However, he does not allow those things to actually bring any falsifying force to bear on 
his belief in a good and loving God. He says that ‘We do not ask the questions that so many ask’, 
rather, when the question is raised we say: ‘[S]ilence!’. Thus, he recommends that – despite the 
seeming falsifying force of the Holocaust – we nonetheless retain our belief in a good and loving 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. xii. 
20 Quoted in Chaim Rapoport, The Messiah problem: Berger, The Angel, and the Scandal of Reckless 
Indiscrimination (Ilford, Ilford Synagogue, 2002), p. 171 fn (I have silently translated Hebrew words into 
English, and taken out some italicisations). 
An almost identical version of this paper appears in God, Mind, & Knowledge, ed. Andrew Moore, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 67-86 
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God. No attempt is made to defuse the falsifying force of the Holocaust for belief in a good and 
loving God, rather, its falsifying force is simply shut down or refused. Rabbi Schwab considers it to be 
irreligious or impious to even try to consider how it could be that a good and loving God could allow 
the Holocaust, and instead of trying to understand the compatibility of a good and loving God and 
the Holocaust we are forcefully exhorted to simply accept their compatibility.  
This approach is exemplified even more forcefully in a sermon of Rabbi Kalonymous Kalman 
Shapira (1889–1943), which he preached to his fellow prisoners, from the depths of the Warsaw 
Ghetto, in December 1941: 
EXAMPLE 9: [O]ne’s faith must ... involve an act of self-surrender ... Now when [the notion of] self-
surrender is applied to the context of faith, the meaning is this: even at a time when God’s presence is 
hidden, one believes in Him; one believes that everything comes from Him, everything is good, 
everything is just, and all the sufferings are full of God’s love for Israel. To our sorrow, we see now that 
even among those people who had been firm believers, certain individuals have had their faith 
weakened. They pose questions, saying in effect, ‘Why have You forsaken us? If the suffering is being 
inflicted upon us in order to bring us closer to Torah and divine service, [why do] we see the opposite 
happening?! The Torah and everything sacred are being destroyed.’ Now if the Jewish person speaks 
this way as an expression of prayer and supplication, as he pours out his heart before God, that is good. 
But if, God forbid, he is posing questions; or even if he is not [actively] questioning, but, in the depths of 
his heart, his faith, God forbid, is weakened, then God help us! Faith is the foundation of everything; 
when one’s faith is, God forbid, weakened, then, God forbid, he is torn away and separated from Him... 
In reality, however, what place is there for arguments, God forbid, and questions? ... [O]ne must 
surrender his soul, his self, his attachments. Then his faith will not be weakened; he will believe with 
perfect faith that everything is [transpiring] with justice and with the love of God for Israel.21 
According to Rabbi Shapira there are sufferings which are so great – and so purely destructive – that 
no reason or explanation could possibly be given for them which would accommodate them within 
the system of our beliefs about God and His workings. No answers can be given, no defusers can be 
provided – but we must bind ourselves to God nonetheless, with a faith that is above reason and 
rationality. Even to go so far as to ‘pose questions’ in one’s heart about God’s justice is to manifest a 
blasphemous impairment of faith, and to ‘tear oneself away’ from God. In short, arguments or 
questions on the matter are ruled out as religiously and spiritually suicidal. Indeed, in serving God 
we must submit not only our wills to Him, but our whole selves, including our reason – thus we 
overcome any falsifying power of the suffering around us by an act of faithful surrender to God 
despite that suffering. If we do that then we see that everything – even the worst torture and 
suffering – ‘is [transpiring] with justice and with the love of God for Israel’. Thus, Rabbi Shapira 
advocates a belief in a good and loving God which is utterly non-falsifiable, which sets itself in the 
face of even the most radical apparently falsifying evidence. It seems that for Rabbi Schwab and 
Rabbi Shapira, the whole issue of falsifiability is taken to be entirely inappropriate to their belief in a 
good and loving God. 
I would like to bring one further examples in this section, because they will show that it is 
possible for utterly non-falsifiable beliefs to nonetheless look a lot like beliefs that are falsifiable. 
Consider the following remarks by Rabbi Emil Fackenheim, who was briefly interned at the 
Sachsenhausen concentration camp from which he escaped and fled to Britain, but whose brother 
was killed in the Holocaust:   
EXAMPLE 10: There is no experience, either without or within, that can possibly destroy religious faith. 
Good fortune without reveals the hand of God; bad fortune, if it is not a matter of just punishment, 
teaches that God’s ways are unintelligible, not that there are no ways of God.22 
The believers exemplified in Section 3 thought they could describe and outline the kinds of reasons 
that God might have for allowing or causing evil – they did not think that God’s reasons were 
                                                 
21 Sermon of December 15th 1941, quoted in Nehemia Polen, The Holy Fire: The Teachings of Rabbi 
Kalonymous Kalman Shapira, the Rebbe of the Warsaw Ghetto (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 82–4. 
22 Emil Fackenheim, ‘On the Eclipse of God’, in Emil L Fackenheim, Quest for Past and Future: Essays in Jewish 
Theology (Boston, Beacon Press, 1968), p. 231. 
An almost identical version of this paper appears in God, Mind, & Knowledge, ed. Andrew Moore, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 67-86 
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unintelligible or unfathomable, rather they just thought that we humans are not in a position to 
know which of the reasons suggested was actually God’s reason on a particular occasion.  Rabbi 
Fackenheim speaks similarly of God having reasons for allowing or causing evils – but he adds the 
caveat that these reasons are not merely beyond our ability to know, but rather, completely beyond 
human capacity even to comprehend. 
 As with all the falsifiable varieties of the belief, Rabbi Fackenheim may even say that there 
are states of affairs which would be incompatible with the truth of his belief in a good and loving 
God. Namely, if all the suffering and evil of this world took place – but without there being any 
reason for it. This is almost identical to what the believer in Example 6 said. But in this case, the 
same words are being used with a different grammar. For the believer in Example 6 could describe 
the kind of thing that he meant by such phrases as ‘suffering with no reason behind it’ – namely, 
suffering which was not causally related in the right way to outweighing goods or greater evils. But 
Rabbi Fackenheim could not say anything at all about what is covered by ‘suffering with no reason 
behind it’ – for when he talks of God’s reasons he adds the caveat that these reasons are completely 
unintelligible to the human mind. But if the kinds of thing that might count as reasons for suffering 
are utterly beyond our understanding and imagination, so too must be the kinds of situation that 
would count as being lacking in reasons. Rabbi Fackenheim could not describe – in anything other 
than the most formal terms – a state of affairs (be it empirical, philosophical, or of any sort) that 
would be incompatible with the truth of his belief, let alone, any state of affairs which could be 
identified and observed to obtain. Thus, when we scratch the surface of the kind of belief presented 
in Example 10, we find that though it is expressed in ways that makes it sound quite similar to 
certain falsifiable forms of the belief in a good and loving God, to all intents and purposes, it is 
actually entirely non-falsifiable. 
If the cluster of examples set out in this section ring true as ways that religious believers 
sometimes actually talk about and treat their beliefs in a good and loving God, then this will have 
made clear that there is a logical variety of this belief which is entirely non-falsifiable – non-
falsifiable both empirically and philosophically, and both with regard to truth and proof. This shows 
that there is something seriously deficient in Rauser’s remarks – quoted in Section 1 – that ‘the 
belief that ‘God loves me’ is in principle as vulnerable to epistemic defeat as beliefs about the 
natural world’.23 This universal statement has completely ignored the kinds of belief in a good and 
loving God which we have seen exemplified in this section.  
Furthermore, just as it is possible for people to have an empirically falsifiable belief in a good 
and loving God without having consciously articulated to themselves what exactly they would take 
to falsify the belief, so too it is possible to have an entirely non-falsifiable belief in a good and loving 
God without having brought the fact of its non-falsifiability to consciousness – for as I said in Section 
2, whether or not a believer holds his belief falsifiably is largely a matter of his dispositions.  
That said, it should be noted that in all the examples set out above, the element of non-
falsifiability was very much present and conscious to the believers who expressed their beliefs. More 
than that, these believers often explicitly took the difference between falsifiable and non-falsifiable 
varieties of belief in a good and loving God to be one laden with religious significance – for according 
to the believers quoted in this section, holding a belief in God’s goodness and love which is falsifiable 
is actually blasphemous, or, at the very least, something sinfully hubristic or a terrible weakening of 
one’s faith. Thus, the distinction between empirically falsifiable and entirely non-falsifiable varieties 
of belief in a good and loving God is not merely a neutral one which is helpful for philosophical 
housekeeping, but rather one of enormous religious significance. In fact, religious communities have 
to hand an array of pejorative descriptions for disapproved-of forms of given religious beliefs – such 
as ‘primitive’, ‘childish’, or even ‘superstitious’, ‘unorthodox’, ‘heretical’, or ‘idolatrous’. It turns out 
that making distinctions between different varieties of a given belief is actually a very common 
practice within religions. 
 
                                                 
23 Rauser, ‘How to Show’. 
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6. The Nature and Significance of the Differences between the above Centres of Variation 
 
The beliefs in the four clusters of examples arrayed above in Sections 2–5 differ with regard to their 
degree and kind of falsifiability, up to an including beliefs that are entirely non-falsifiable. As 
Wittgenstein says, ‘[i]f someone says he believes something then we can’t always tell what he 
believes merely from the words he uses... It is so often a matter of finding what things are connected 
with what he says.’24 To say that one belief differs from another with regards to its degree and kind 
of falsifiability is simply to point out one way in which different ‘things are connected with’ each of 
the two beliefs. Insofar as the degree and kind of falsifiability of a given belief is a part of its logic, 
the beliefs of the four clusters of examples arrayed above differ in their logics. How significant these 
logical differences are taken to be will be a function of how significant the differences with regard to 
degree and kind of falsifiability are taken to be.  
 As it happens, the difference between a belief that is observably empirically falsifiable and 
one that is entirely non-falsifiable is one that is usually very significant to us. For example, a belief 
that is observably empirically falsifiable can be used to predict the obtaining or non-obtaining of 
certain observable empirical states of affairs, whereas an entirely non-falsifiable belief cannot 
ground any such predictions. Moreover, an observably empirically falsifiable belief can be 
contradicted by the obtaining or non-obtaining of observable states of affairs, and therefore found 
to be false, whereas an entirely non-falsifiable belief cannot be found to be false in any such way. 
Furthermore, observably empirically falsifiable beliefs directly connect to, and interact with, a whole 
host of other beliefs that we have – namely, our other empirical beliefs about the world, what 
makes it up, and what happens in it – in ways which entirely non-falsifiable beliefs do not. Since 
these matters of proof and evidence, predictive power, truth and falsity, consistency of belief, and 
the like play significant roles in our lives, the logical difference between observably empirically 
falsifiable beliefs and entirely non-falsifiable ones is a significant one. Thus, talk of falsifiability or 
non-falsifiability is really shorthand for an interlocking web of qualities which are usually 
fundamental to the logic of our beliefs. Falsifiability is not a logical quality that belongs narrowly or 
especially to beliefs of the natural sciences; rather, it speaks much more broadly to the issues of the 
extent to which a belief is sensitive to reality, and the kind of reality it is sensitive to (empirical, 
scientific, metaphysical, etc., or none at all).25 Thus, if both some of the beliefs exemplified in Section 
2 (observably empirically falsifiable ones) and some of those exemplified in Section 5 (entirely non-
falsifiable ones), were recognised by the reader as being kinds of belief actually held by some 
religious believers, then it will have been recognised that belief in a good and loving God comes in 
more than one logical variety. 
 By saying that the beliefs exemplified in Section 2 and in Section 5 are of different logical 
varieties I am saying nothing more than that their logics are different in significant ways. Because 
significance is interest-relative, the matter of categorising beliefs in a good and loving God in 
logically fine-grained ways will always be open to disagreement. I have placed two distinct logical 
categories between those of observably empirically falsifiable beliefs and entirely non-falsifiable 
ones – namely, those of Sections 3 and 4. But if one wanted to deny that the differences between 
those two intermediate clusters were significant enough to warrant their being counted as a distinct 
logical varieties, this would be fine – as long as the logical differences between them were noted and 
                                                 
24 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Wittgenstein’s Saturday Discussions: 1946-1947’, in Ludwig Wittgenstein, eds. & trans. 
James C Klagge & Alfred Nordmann, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions (Lanham, Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003), p. 404. 
25 Thus I could just as well have shown the logical variety amongst beliefs in a good and loving God by 
focussing on other logical qualities, such as for example, the given beliefs’ degree of groundedness or non-
groundedness in evidence, and the kinds of evidence involved. Falsifiability or otherwise is a convenient and 
dramatic way of looking at the logical differences between beliefs, but it is by no means the only one.  
An almost identical version of this paper appears in God, Mind, & Knowledge, ed. Andrew Moore, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 67-86 
 
12 
 
not glided over. As Wittgenstein says in a slightly different context: ‘Say what you choose, so long as 
it does not prevent you from seeing the facts.’26   
Now, it might be objected to the above that one cannot necessarily learn about the content 
of a belief from its ramifications, and therefore that one cannot say that one belief has a different 
logic from another just because it implies or is implied by different kinds of thing. Simple reflection, 
however, will show that this objection must be misguided. For whether or not a belief implies that 
one’s child will survive his illness, or whether or not it implies that certain kinds of good must 
eventually come about, will be a matter of the content of the belief in question. The content of a 
belief and its inferential ramifications are internally related – they are mutually constitutive of one 
another. 
A second, more promising objection, grants that the content of a belief is internally related 
to its degree and kind of falsifiability. What it calls into doubt is that the degree and kind of 
falsifiability that a believer takes his own belief to have – and treats it as having – is necessarily an 
accurate reflection of the degree and kind of falsifiability that the belief actually has. The basis for 
this objection is the recognition that a believer can be mistaken or confused about the logic of the 
belief that he holds. For example, a believer in a good and loving God could take his belief to be 
observably empirically falsifiable simply because the various possible philosophical defusers of those 
prima facie empirical falsifiers have never occurred to him. Thus, he takes his belief to be – and 
treats it as being – observably empirically falsifiable, when in actual fact it is only philosophically 
falsifiable. This is indeed a good observation, and I would not want to deny that people can 
sometimes be mistaken or confused about the logic of their own beliefs – and therefore treat them 
in a way that is not fitting for that belief and in a way which therefore does not inform us accurately 
about the belief.  
However, though such mistakes or confusions are possible, this fact cannot be used to deny 
that there are multiple logical varieties of belief in a good and loving God. For though a person can 
sometimes be mistaken or confused about the logic of his own belief, there are plenty of cases in 
which it would be very unreasonable to claim this. Consider someone who is suspected of being 
mistaken or confused about the logic of his belief. Imagine that the person who suspects the 
believer of being mistaken or confused proceeds to explain to the believer the alternative logic that 
the former takes to be the correct one for the believer’s belief, and the believer shows that he 
clearly understands this alternative logic. For example, a person who takes his belief in a good and 
loving God to be observably empirically falsifiable may be suspected of simply not having realised 
that his belief is actually only philosophically falsifiable, because he has not realised that all prima 
facie empirical falsifiers can be defused by means of a good philosophical theodicy. The believer who 
has this explained to him, and who understand it clearly, may react in one of two ways. He may be 
grateful and admit that he hadn’t thought of that, and that it therefore turns out that in actual fact 
his belief is not, and never was, observably empirically falsifiable at all. However, another believer 
may fully understand the form of the belief that is only philosophically falsifiable, and deny that this 
is his belief. This believer may insist that his belief is one that is observably empirically falsifiable – 
for if God really is a good Father then there are certain obvious and observable things that He simply 
will not allow. The believer may add that if anyone denies this, then clearly they must mean by ‘good 
and loving’ something quite different to what he, the believer, means. If this is the believer’s 
reaction, then it would seem difficult to claim that this may be a case in which he is mistaken or 
confused about the logic of his belief. After all, if a person fully understands a given variety of a 
belief, then his honest denial that this is the variety of the belief that he holds, will itself be partly 
constitutive of the fact that the belief he holds is not of that logical variety.27 There is a degree of 
                                                 
26 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part I, §79. 
27 Ruth Garrett Millikan, in a different context, observes that “there is … a tendency for the object of one’s 
thought to become whatever one takes it to be” (‘On Unclear and Indistinct Ideas’, Philosophical Perspectives, 
8 (1994), p. 75). Similarly, there is a tendency for the logic of one’s belief to become – at least partially – 
whatever one takes it to be. 
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radical misunderstanding of a belief which it does not make sense to attribute to a person. For at a 
certain point it makes no sense to attribute to someone a belief of a variety which they completely 
and utterly misunderstand, and it makes sense, instead, to admit that they actually understand their 
belief perfectly well, only that they hold a different variety of the belief to the one that we initially 
thought they held.  
We can therefore imagine each of the believers of the above examples being confronted 
clearly with the logics of the alternative varieties of the belief, and being asked if, perhaps, they 
might not be mistaken about the nature of their belief. We can imagine cases in which the believers 
might agree that they were mistaken, but we can equally imagine cases in which they would not 
admit to any such mistake or confusion. And since this reaction is perfectly intelligible, the objection 
that the way a believer treats his belief may be out of sync with its true logic does not threaten to 
collapse the multiple different varieties that I have laid out above into only one. 
The above reasoning applies to distinctions between logical varieties of any degree of fine- 
or course-grainedness. But when it comes to logical varieties which are radically different – such as 
the difference between observably empirically falsifiable beliefs and entirely non-falsifiable ones – 
the idea that a person could hold a belief of one of these kinds but mistakenly treat it as though it 
were of the other, becomes extremely hard to understand. With Wittgenstein, we might want to say 
that ‘[f]or a blunder, that's too big’.28 This means that at the very least the fact that some believers 
treat their belief in a good and loving God as observably empirically falsifiable, and others treat 
theirs as entirely non-falsifiable, should show that there is more than one logical variety of the 
belief. 
 
 
7. Conclusion and Further Directions 
 
The aim of this paper has been to show that belief in a good and loving God is not logically uniform, 
but rather, that it can and does come in multiple logical varieties. Analytic philosophy of religion 
seems often to work on the assumption that all religious beliefs are logically uniform (that is, that all 
instances of belief in God are of the same logical kind as each other, and all instances of belief in the 
afterlife are of the same logical kind as each other, and the like). The most effective way to 
undermine this presumption of uniformity is to present examples of a range of different logical 
varieties of a given belief and simply to ask: ‘But do not religious believers also hold beliefs like 
this?’. I hope that in working through the range of examples arrayed above the reader will not just 
get a sense of the logical varieties of belief in a good and loving God, but also a sense of how easy it 
would be to lay out a similar range of logically varied examples for other core religious beliefs – such 
as belief in miracles, in God’s creation of the world, in the efficacy of petitionary prayer, in the 
afterlife, and many more.  
It is important to recognise the existence of logical variety in religious beliefs – as I 
mentioned in the Introduction – because failure to do so often leads both to misevaluations and to 
distortions of the beliefs in question. Therefore, since philosophers of religion spend so much of 
their time trying to provide elucidations or evaluations of religious beliefs, the recognition of the 
logical variety of many religious beliefs ought to be fundamental to much of what philosophers of 
religion do. 
However, more than simply helping us to avoid misevaluating and distorting religious beliefs, 
recognising the existence of logical variety is also important for a further reason – for logical variety 
is the foundation upon which further important logical qualities rest, so that failure to recognise 
logical variety will almost certainly lead to failure to recognise these second-level qualities as well. 
Thus, the logical variety exhibited by the belief in a good and loving God often gives rise, in turn, to 
                                                 
28 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Lectures on Religious Belief’, in Ludwig Wittgenstein, ed. Cyril Barrett, Lectures & 
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief: compiled from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, 
Rush Rhees and James Taylor (Oxford, Blackwell, 1966), p. 62. 
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people holding that belief in a way that is indeterminate, mixed, or fluid between those different 
varieties. That is, someone’s belief in a good and loving God may hover indeterminately between 
more than one logical variety of the belief; or it may mix together some of the logical characteristics 
of different varieties of the belief; or it may change from having one logical character to another and 
perhaps back again. The fact that people’s religious beliefs are often logically indeterminate, mixed, 
or fluid, will be masked by the fact that the belief is always expressed by the same sentence 
regardless; and yet, these logical qualities are very common amongst religious beliefs, and account 
for much of the real-life complexity and messiness that is characteristic of religious beliefs as actually 
held.  
Sometimes, of course, indeterminacy, mixedness, and fluidity will be manifestations of 
doxastic vices, such as confusion or evasion on the part of the believer. At other times, however, 
they can constitute doxastic virtues of positive religious significance. For example, certain kinds of 
indeterminacy and mixedness can be the result of the multi-layered nature of some religious beliefs; 
and certain kinds of fluidity can be manifestations of processes of religious growth or of a natural 
ebb and flow in religious life. There is no room here to enter into a full discussion of the nature and 
significance of the qualities of logical indeterminacy, mixedness, and fluidity, in religious belief. But I 
hope that in highlighting the logical variety that exists in one central religious belief, I have not only 
brought attention to that variety itself, but also helped to lay some groundwork for a more detailed 
study of the important logical qualities that derive from it29.30 
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